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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Article VIII, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, § 78-2-2(3), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) (1987 Replacement), and Rule 3(a), Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in favor of U.S. Life 
Title Insurance Company of Dallas (hereinafter referred to as 
"U.S. Life Title")(incorrectly referred to in plaintiff's 
complaint as "U.S. Title Insurance Company of Dallas") which 
dismissed the Complaint of Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley 
Bank" or "the Bank") with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case: 
1. Did Valley Bank's placing of its "SBA Trust Deed" on 
property covered by a title insurance policy insuring a subsequent 
trust deed "create" a defect, lien or encumbrance within the 
meaning of a policy exclusion? 
2. Did U.S. Life Title owe a duty to Valley Bank to 
disclose in its commitment of title insurance or its policy the 
existence of the prior trust deed held by Valley Bank? 
3. May Valley Bank for the first time on appeal raise 
the issue of equitable estoppel? 
4. Inasmuch as the first trust deed lien on the subject 
property has been released, has Valley Bank suffered any loss as a 
result of the existence of that trust deed at the time of the 
issuance of the Title Insurance Policy? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
U.S. Life Title believes that Valley Bank's brief 
accurately reflects the nature of the case and the course of 
proceedings below. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Valley Bank, a Utah corporation, is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 3; T. 3.) Valley Mortgage Corporation ("Valley Mortgage") is 
also a wholly owned subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation. 
_d.) Valley Mortgage often acts as an agent for Valley Bank in 
arranging for and closing Valley Bank mortgage loans (T. 18). 
2. On or about April 1, 1983, the department of Valley 
Bank charged with making loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration of the United States ("the SBA Department") made a 
loan in the sum of $65,000.00 to F. Kent Nance and Patricia J. 
Nance. (Hereinafter the said loan will be referred to as the "SBA 
Loan" and the trust deed which secured payment of that loan will 
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be referred to as the "SBA Trust Deed".) The SBA Loan was secured 
by a trust deed lien on the Nances' residence located in Summit 
County, Utah, and by a security interest in certain personal 
property. (Valley Bank Complaint, If 7, R.3; T. 98; plaintiffs 
exhibit 6.) The SBA Trust Deed was recorded April 5, 1983. 
(Plaintiffs exhibit 6.) 
3. A few weeks after obtaining the SBA Loan the Nances 
contacted Valley Bank or Valley Mortgage for the purpose of 
obtaining a conventional mortgage loan, ostensibly for the purpose 
of paying off a prior mortgage held by another lender, First 
Security Bank. (T. 25-26.) The Nances apparently did not 
disclose to the loan officer that they had recently obtained the 
SBA Loan from Valley Bank. (T. 40.) 
4. The loan officer with whom the Nances dealt in 
applying for their conventional mortgage loan (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Residential Loan") was Paul Thurston, an 
employee of Valley Mortgage, who was acting as agent for Valley 
Bank in closing mortgage loans. (T. 17, 18.) When the loan was 
finally made, however, the lender was Valley Bank and the loan was 
made using Valley Bank forms. (T. 44; plaintiff's exhibit 1.) 
5. Preparatory to the making of the Residential Loan 
Valley Mortgage, acting as agent for Valley Bank, contacted 
Mountain View Title, an agent of U.S. Life Title, and requested a 
commitment for title insurance. (T. 23, 24.) 
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6. In response to Mr, Thurston's request, Mountain View 
Title produced and delivered to him the requested Commitment for 
Title Insurance ("the Commitment") showing the "proposed insured" 
as "Valley Mortgage", (Plaintiff's exhibit 2 (a copy of which is 
attached to this Brief as Addendum 2).) The Commitment was 
apparently prepared by Mountain View Title from an earlier 
commitment prepared by another title insurer, Utah Title, as part 
of the documentation of the SBA Loan, (T. 130, 155.) 
7. The Commitment describes in its Schedule B-II a 
number of matters which were to be excepted from coverage under 
the policy of title insurance which was to follow. Significantly, 
the list of excepted matters did not include the SBA Trust Deed. 
The reason for this omission was apparently that the earlier 
commitment produced by Utah Title upon which the Mountain View 
commitment was based had not listed the SBA Trust Deed as an 
exception. 
8. The Residential Loan was closed on approximately 
April 26, 1983. The amount of the loan was $101,500.00. 
Thereafter the Residential Loan trust deed ("the Residential Trust 
Deed") was recorded on April 26, 1983, (Plaintiff's exhibit 1; 
T, 4.) 
9. After the Residential Loan closed Mountain View 
Title, acting as agent for U.S. Life Title, issued a "mortgagee 
policy of title insurance" ("the Policy"). (Plaintiff's exhibit 3.) 
(The Policy is attached to this Brief as Addendum 3.) Even though 
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Mountain View Title had discovered the SBA Trust Deed following 
the issuance of the Commitment, the Policy did not show that prior 
lien as a described exception to the coverage. Mountain View 
Title's failure to list the SBA Trust Deed as an exception in the 
Policy was due to the fact that it believed that Valley Bank 
intended to release the SBA Trust Deed. (T. 127-128.) 
10. Subsequent to the closing of the Residential Loan-
apparently for administrative convenience—Valley Bank assigned 
the Residential Trust Deed to Valley Mortgage who, in turn, sold 
the loan, and assigned the Trust Deed, to Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"). (T. 37-39; plaintiff's 
exhibits 4, 5.) 
11. On November 18, 1983, Intermountain Thrift & Loan, a 
subsidiary of Valley Utah Bancorporation, loaned the Nances the 
sum of $10,000.00 and took as collateral a trust deed on the same 
property described in the SBA and Residential Trust Deeds, as well 
as an adjacent lot owned by the Nances. (T. 7; plaintiff's 
exhibit 18.) 
12. During the period between March and June of 1984, 
the Nances defaulted on the SBA, Residential, and Intermountain 
Thrift loans. (T. 80, 98.) As a consequence, Valley Bank, 
Freddie Mac, and Intermountain Thrift, respectively, each filed 
notices of default as part of the nonjudicial trust deed 
foreclosure procedure provided by Utah law. (Plaintiff's exhibits 
8, 19, 20; T. 54-55, 58-59.) 
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13. No trustee's sale on the SBA and Residential Trust 
Deeds was ever held. (T. 85, 107.) Instead, a trustee's sale was 
conducted on or about April 4, 1985, pursuant to the foreclosure 
of the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed which was subordinate to 
the liens of the SBA and Residential Trust Deeds. (Plaintiff's 
exhibit 8A; T. 60.) (The trustee's deed is attached as 
Addendum 4.) 
14. The successful bidder at the Intermountain Thrift 
trustee's sale was Valley Bank who "credit bid" the sum of 
$11,941.45. (T. 63, 74.) By a Trustee's Deed dated April 4, 1985, 
Valley Bank as trustee under the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed 
conveyed fee title to itself as the successful bidder at the 
trustee's sale. (Plaintiff's exhibit 8A.) 
15. After it discovered the existence of the SBA Loan 
Freddie Mac demanded that Valley Bank repurchase the Residential 
Loan or that it remedy the Nances' default in the payment of their 
monthly installments. (T. 81; plaintiff's exhibit 10.) In 
response Valley Bank, through Valley Mortgage, brought all 
payments current. (T. 82.) Eventually, however, Valley Bank 
decided to pay off the loan. Accordingly, in December of 1986, 
Valley Bank paid Freddie Mac the sum of $103,912.78 in complete 
satisfaction of its repurchase obligation. (T. 82.) Although 
Although Freddie Mac was paid with a Valley Mortgage check, 
the latter merely acted as a servicing agent and received 
reimbursement for the payment from Valley Bank. (T. 87.) 
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Valley Bank paid Freddie Mac the payoff on the loan—apparently 
pursuant to a recourse agreement—the loan was not assigned to 
Valley Bank by Freddie Mac. Instead, Freddie Mac requested that 
the trustee under the Residential Trust Deed reconvey the Trust 
Deed, thus releasing the lien. (T. 95-96.) As of the date of the 
trial, the deed of reconveyance had not yet been recorded. (Id.) 
16. Subsequent to its discovery of the existence of the 
SBA Trust Deed and while it still owned the Residential Loan 
Freddie Mac made demand upon U.S. Life Title to defend Freddie 
Mac's interest under its Trust Deed. On November 22, 1985, 
subsequent to Valley Bank's purchase of the property at the 
Intermountain Thrift trustee's sale, U.S. Life Title denied 
coverage under the Policy and refused Freddie Mac's tender of 
defense. (Plaintiff's exhibit 11.) 
17. As noted above the SBA Trust Deed was never 
foreclosed upon. At trial an employee of the SBA Department of 
Valley Bank offered the following explanation for the Bank's 
failure to pursue its foreclosure to completion: 
Q. [W]as there ever a foreclosure sale on the SBA 
Loan? On the subject property? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because our lien was superior to any of the 
others that were being foreclosed upon. 
Q. But your lien was in default. Didn't you 
customarily foreclose on loans in default? 
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A. Yes sir. We normally would. 
Q. Why didn't you in this case? 
A. Because it was, you know, another entity of 
Valley Bank & Trust Company, on a sister 
company so to speak, and in talking with SBA we 
worked out an agreement with SBA to let them go 
ahead and foreclose it and go through the 
expense rather than have our department and SBA 
sharing expenses. 
Q. So SBA, that is the SBA Department of Valley 
Bank agreed not to foreclose on its loan, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 106-107.) The SBA Trust Deed was subsequently released by a 
deed of reconveyance dated December 23, 1986. (Defendant's 
exhibit 25.) 
18. Several months after its purchase of the insured 
property, together with the adjacent lot, at the trustee's sale in 
the Intermountain Thrift foreclosure, Valley Bank sold the 
property to Gary and Shauna Weaver for $55,000.00. Purchase of 
the property was financed by Valley Bank who gave the Weavers a 
warranty deed and took back a trust deed to secure payment of a 
note in the sum of $40,000.00. (T. 101- 102; plaintiff's exhibits 
9, 21, 22.) 
19. The Policy contains the following "Exclusions From 
Coverage": 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse 
claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, 
assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant . . 
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(Plaintiff's exhibit 3 (second page).) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
U.S. Life Title has endeavored to organize its arguments 
to roughly correspond to those of Valley Bank as contained in its 
Brief. Accordingly, Points I.A., B., and C. address the issues 
raised in Valley Bank's Arguments II.B, C, and D, respectively. 
(U.S. Life Title does not dispute the general proposition proposed 
in Valley Bank's Argument I that this court may review the trial 
court's conclusions of law.) Point II addresses the issues raised 
in Valley Bank's Argument II.A and Point III sets forth U.S. Life 
Title's response to Argument IV. 
Inasmuch as the appellant's Argument III does not appear 
to be based upon any particular legal theory—it merely asserts 
the proposition that enforcement of the terms of the Policy would 
not be fair to Valley Bank—no specific response has been 
attempted. Rather, U.S. Life Title has dealt with the arguments 
raised in Argument III in the context of its response to the other 
Arguments. 
Point IV of this Brief deals with the general question of 
whether Valley Bank has met its burden of proving that the 
existence of the SBA Trust Deed damaged Valley Bank. The argument 
contained in Point IV is based upon the evidence which shows that 
the Residential Trust Deed was lost by merger of that trust deed 
into the fee title acquired by Valley Bank subsequent to the 
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foreclosure sale of the Intermountain Thrift Trust Deed. The 
evidence also shows that the SBA Trust Deed was never foreclosed, 
that it was subsequently released, and that during the time it was 
in existence the SBA lien did not prevent Valley Bank from 
foreclosing on the Residential Trust Deed and would not have 
interfered with any marketing of the property following 
foreclosure. Thus there was no loss to Valley Bank which was 
covered by the Policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE SBA TRUST DEED LIEN IS EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER 
THE POLICY BECAUSE VALLEY BANK "CREATED" THAT LIEN. 
As noted above in the Statement of Facts, Valley Bank 
caused the subject property to be encumbered with the lien of the 
SBA Trust Deed on April 5, 1983. Since the Policy specifically 
excludes from coverage any "defects, liens, [or] encumbrances 
. . . created ... by the insured claimant . . .", the court below 
concluded that "the lien of the SBA Trust Deed is excluded from 
coverage under the Policy by paragraph 3(a) of the Exclusions From 
Coverage." (R. 107; Addendum 1.) Valley Bank disputes the trial 
court's conclusion on three qrounds: (1) in obtaining the SBA 
Trust Deed Valley Bank did not intend to defraud the insurer. 
(2) U.S. Life Title knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed. 
(3) Valley Bank did not have knowledge of the existence of the SBA 
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Trust Deed. These arguments will be considered in subpoints A, B, 
and C of this Point, 
A, VALLEY BANK CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY CAUSED THE SBA TRUST 
DEED TO COME INTO EXISTENCE. 
Under the rubric "Exclusions From Coverage" the Policy 
states: 
The following matters are expressly excluded 
from the coverage of this policy: 
X . . . . 
2. . . . 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse 
claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, 
assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant . . . 
Relying on the above language and on evidence that the SBA 
Department of Valley Bank caused the SBA Trust Deed lien to be 
placed on the subject property, the court below concluded that the 
lien was excluded from coverage under the Policy because Valley 
Bank had "created" a lien or encumbrance on the property. In this 
appeal Valley Bank argues that it did not "create" the SBA Trust 
Deed lien because it did not deliberately act to create that 
2 
lien and because Valley Bank was not guilty of fraud or 
3 
misconduct. For the reasons stated below those arguments are 
untenable. 
2
"A person cannot be deemed to have created a defect when 
that person did not deliberately act to bring about the defect or 
when the person had no knowledge of the existence of the defect." 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 26.) 
3Min the absence of fraud or misconduct on the part of 
Valley Bank, the exclusion for defects created by the insured 
should not apply." (Brief of Appellant, p. 17.) 
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1. Vallev Bank Created The Lien, 
Valley Bank's argument that it did not McreateM the SBA 
Trust Deed lien appears to be based upon the following syllogism: 
(major premise) the word -create" implies deliberate rather than 
inadvertent causation; (minor premise) Valley Bank did not intend 
to cause the existence of the SBA Trust Deed; (conclusion) 
therefore Valley Bank did not "create" the Trust Deed, 
As a general proposition the word "create" appears to 
require only causation, not deliberate causation. Thus BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) defines the word "create" as follows: 
"To bring into being; to cause to exist; to produce; as, to create 
a trust, to create a corporation." Nevertheless courts which have 
interpreted the word "created" as used in the standard title 
insurance policy exclusion have required intentional causation. 
Thus, in American Savings & Loan Association v. Lawyers Title Ins. 
Corp., 793 F.2d 760, 784 (6th Cir. 1985), the court stated: 
The term "created" has generally been 
construed to require a conscious, deliberate and 
sometimes affirmative act intended to bring about 
the conflicting claim, in contrast to mere 
inadvertence or negligence. 
Accord, Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 33 
Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1963); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 87 
N.J. Super. 391, 404, 209 A.2d 640, 648 (App. Div. 1968). 
The weakness of Valley Bank's reasoning lies in its minor 
premise that it did not deliberately cause the SBA Trust Deed to 
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exist. Such an argument is particularly difficult to understand 
when one considers that Valley Bank freely admits that "[t]he 
Small Business Administration Department is a department of Valley 
Bank" (Brief of Appellant, pp. 27-28) and "the SBA Department 
created the SBA Trust Deed." (Brief of Appellant, p. 29.) If the 
SBA Department is a department of Valley Bank and if that 
department created the SBA Trust Deed, then under well-recognized 
principles of agency it would follow that Valley Bank "created" 
the SBA Trust Deed. Thus it has been stated: 
Any person who is sui juris and has capacity 
to affect his legal relationships by the giving 
of consent to a delegable act or transaction may 
authorize an agent to act for him with the same 
effect as if he were to act in person. The 
principal may be either a natural person or an 
artificial one. 
3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 9, pp. 516-17 (1962). 
The "quibble" in Zions* argument appears to lie in the 
fact that the mortgage department of Valley Bank which made the 
Residential Loan did not know of the existence of a loan made by 
another department of the Bank, the SBA Department. But as more 
fully discussed in Point I.C., below, the knowledge of the agent 
(the SBA Department) imparts knowledge to the principal, Valley 
Bank. Thus Valley Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed 
when it closed the Residential Loan. 
The real issue in this case is not whether the mortgage 
department of Valley Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust 
Deed, rather, it is whether the SBA Department—an agent of Valley 
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Bank—consciously and deliberately intended to bring into 
existence the SBA Trust Deed. If it did not—if it created 
that Trust Deed by inadvertence or mistake—then the lien is 
unenforceable and could never have caused any diminution in the 
value of the Residential Trust Deed. On the other hand, if the 
SBA Department truly did intend to place a trust deed lien on the 
subject property, then, as the SBA Department's principal, Valley 
Bank intentionally and deliberately caused that Trust Deed to come 
into existence. Indeed, Valley Bank does not seriously argue that 
the SBA Trust Deed was created through inadvertence or mistake. 
It merely asserts that the Mortgage Department did not know about 
the loan. Nevertheless, the evidence clearly demonstrates that 
the SBA Department, and hence Valley Bank knew about and created 
the SBA Trust Deed. 
2. The Policy Exclusion For Liens Created By The Insured 
Does Not Require That The Insured Be Guilty Of Fraud Or 
Misconduct. 
Argument II.B. of the Brief of Appellant is devoted to 
the proposition that more than deliberate causation is required to 
exclude a lien or encumbrance ••created" by the insured under a 
policy of title insurance. Instead, says the Appellant, the 
insurer must demonstrate that the insured has been guilty of fraud 
or misconduct. Thus Valley Bank states, M[T]he exclusion should 
not be enforced in the absence of fraud or misconduct on the part 
of the insured." (Brief of Appellant, p. 20.) 
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Valley Bank's argument flies in the face of the 
well-recognized rule that the word "created" requires only Ma 
conscious, deliberate and sometimes affirmative act intended to 
bring about the conflicting claim . . •" American Savings & Loan 
Association v. Lawyers Title Ins, Corp., supra, 793 F.2d at 784. 
The argument appears to be based upon a misunderstanding of cases 
which have attempted to interpret the standard exclusion for liens 
"created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant". 
Unlike the present case, most such cases have involved 
fact situations in which it was not clear whether there had been 
deliberate causation of the prior lien or encumbrance by the 
insured. Thus, for example, in American Savings, supra, a case 
discussed at some length in the Brief of Appellant, the court was 
called upon to decide whether the insured lender's underfunding of 
a construction project and the resulting creation of mechanics' 
liens demonstrated that the lender had "suffered, assumed or 
agreed to" the creation of the mechanics' liens. Although the 
court in dictum discussed the meaning of the word "created", it 
specifically noted that counsel for the title insurance company 
had "conceded that American ha[d] not created or agreed to the 
mechanics' liens within the meaning of the policy." id. at 784 
n.l. Reversing a magistrate's decision the Court of Appeals found 
that the mere underfunding of the project did not show that the 
insured lender had assumed or agreed to the creation of the 
mechanics' liens. 
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By contrast in Brown v. St. Paul Title Ins. Corp., 634 
F.2d 1103 (8th Cir. 1980) and in Banker's Trust Co. v. 
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1979), the 
courts found that the failure of insured lenders to disburse 
committed funds, thereby causing unpaid materialmen and suppliers 
to file mechanics* liens, demonstrated that the insured had 
created or suffered the existence of those encumbrances. 
It should be noted that in none of those cases, and, 
indeed, in none of the cases cited by Valley Bank in its Brief, 
did the court find that a prior encumbrance consciously and 
deliberately created by the insured was outside of the 
exclusionary language of the policy. For example, in American 
Savings the court found that the lender neither intended to create 
mechanics' liens nor caused (suffered) them to be created. 
Similarly, in Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal.App.2d 
531, 33 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1963) (discussed at pp. 23-24 of Brief of 
Appellant) the court held that execution by the insured of an 
ambiguous document which created a cloud on the title did not fall 
within the exclusionary language of the policy because the signing 
of the document did not involve "conscious, deliberate causation" 
of the defect. 220 Cal. App. 2d at 535. Thus in Hansen there was 
neither intentional causation nor misconduct by the insured. 
By contrast, all of the other cases relied upon by 
Appellant deal with insureds to whom coverage was denied because 
of their fraud or misconduct. Significantly, Valley Bank is 
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unable to direct the court's attention to a single instance where 
a court has held that the exclusion in question would not apply 
because the insured's creation of an encumbrance was innocent, 
albeit deliberate. 
Illustrative of the principle that the word "created" 
requires only deliberate causation, not fraud or misconduct, is 
the case of Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos, 172 Cal.Rptr. 
248, 116 Cal.App. 3d 658, 18 A.L.R.4th 1301 (1981). There the 
insured, Moskopoulos, had been sued by an earlier owner of the 
subject property seeking rescission or imposition of a 
constructive trust based upon the alleged improper clouding of the 
previous owner's title by Moskopoulos. He tendered defense of the 
claim to his title insurer, Safeco, who denied coverage. In 
upholding the decision of the trial court which found against 
Moskopoulos the appellate court held that the alleged defect was 
not in existence on the date that the policy was issued. In 
addition, in dictum, the court stated that under policy language 
identical to that under consideration in this case coverage of the 
defect arising from the action filed by the prior owner was, in 
reality, "created by the insured." The court stated: 
In the instant case the interpretation [of 
the evidence] most favorable to appellant is 
"conscious, deliberate causation on the part of 
appellant. Appellant testified, and the trial 
court found, that appellant's conduct throughout 
the entire transaction was intentional and 
deliberate and not inadvertent or mistaken. 
Accordingly, the exclusionary provisions are 
applicable for the reason that appellant 
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"created" the "adverse claim" against which he 
seeks to have Safeco defend him. Since the 
exclusion applies, there is no duty to defend." 
18 A.L.R.4th at 1309 (emphasis added). 
It is significant to note that the court in Safeco Title 
did not emphasize any misconduct on the part of the insured, even 
though there appeared to have been such, but rather based its 
conclusion on the fact that the actions of the insured constituted 
"conscious, deliberate causation." The obvious inference is that 
the court believed that application of the "created" exclusion 
requires a showing of "intentional and deliberate" causation, not 
the mere absence of fraud or misconduct. 
Since in this case it is clear that Valley Bank's SBA 
Department intended to "create" the SBA Trust Deed, that lien was 
excluded from Policy coverage. 
B. U.S. LIFE TITLE'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST 
DEED IS IRRELEVANT TO A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER VALLEY BANK 
"CREATED" THAT LIEN. 
In Argument II.C. of its Brief, Appellant suggests the 
novel theory that the "created" exclusion found in paragraph 3(a) 
of the Policy is only applicable if the insurer has no knowledge 
4 
of the title defect. As authority for this proposition 
4The heading to Appellant's Argument II.C. states, "Because 
U.S. Title knew about the SBA Trust Deed, Valley Bank should not 
be deemed to have created the SBA Trust Deed within the meaning of 
the exclusion." 
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Valley Bank cites the cases of Hansen v. Western Title Ins. Co., 
supra, and Ginger v. American Title Ins. Co., 29 Mich. App. 279, 
185 N.W. 2d 54 (1970). A close reading of those cases reveals, 
however, that Valley Bank's reliance on them is misplaced. 
As noted above, in Hansen the defect in the title which 
the insured was supposed to have "created" consisted of an 
ambiguity in a recorded document signed by the insured and drafted 
by the insured's attorney. In response to the insurer's 
contention that the title defect had been "created" by the insured 
within the meaning of the policy exclusion the court recited the 
rule that the word "created" implies "an intentional doing by the 
insured". 220 Cal.App.2d at 536. The court went on to suggest, 
however, that even where the lien had been created by 
inadvertence, the exclusion might still apply if the insurer had 
no notice of the defect, but the insured did. It said: 
Although we would be inclined to make an 
outright restriction of the word "created," as 
used in the policy, to an intentional doing by 
the insured, nevertheless, because of our 
unwillingness to decide more than we must in a 
case so lacking in precedent, we limit our ruling 
to a case in which the insured did not 
intentionally produce the claim and in which the 
insurer itself had opportunity to know the 
defect. It is conceivable that a case could 
arise where the insured's inadvertence or mistake 
would produce a defect which would be outside the 
power of the insurer reasonably to find; but such 
a case is far removed from this. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thus, far from standing for the proposition that the 
exclusionary language is inapplicable where the insurer was aware 
of the defect, Hansen suggests a possible exception to the general 
rule requiring an intentional act by the insured, if the title 
insurer could not reasonably have known of the defect. 
By contrast, Ginger v. American Title involved not only 
interpretation of the "created" exclusion, but also a second 
standard exclusion as to defects, liens, and encumbrances "known 
to the insured • . . and not shown by the public records, unless 
disclosure thereof in writing by the insured shall have been made 
5 
to the company [insurer] . . . " As to the applicability of the 
two exclusions the court stated: 
The defect in this case was the fraudulent 
character of the purported conveyance. Such 
defect was known to plaintiff but not disclosed 
to his insurer. We hold that this defect was 
expressly excluded from coverage in the policy 
under . . . [both clauses]. 
I£. at 56. 
Although the court in Ginger did not further describe the 
facts which gave rise to application of each exclusion, the 
logical inference is that the insured's failure to disclose the 
fraudulent conveyance to the title insurer was relevant only to 
the applicability of the second exclusion (which is identical to 
^An identical provision appears in the Policy as Exclusion 
3(b). 
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paragraph 3(b) of the Policy), since it specifically requires that 
the insured give notice of defects to the title insurer. 
Furthermore, the language of the Policy gives no support 
to the notion that a lien is not "created" by the insured if the 
title insurer knows of its creation. Indeed, since Exclusion 3(a) 
makes no mention of notice to the insurer, while Exclusion 3(b) 
specifically requires that such notice be given, the clear 
implication is that knowledge or notice is not a prerequisite to 
the application of subparagraph (a). This fact, coupled with the 
absence of any authority which supports Valley Bank's theory, must 
lead to the rejection of that theory. 
C. VALLEY BANK KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED. 
In Argument II.D. of its Brief Valley Bank suggests that 
the exclusion of paragraph 3(a) is inapplicable because "Valley 
Bank did not have knowledge of the SBA Trust Deed". (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 25.) As discussed in Point I.A.I, of this Brief, 
the argument erroneously focuses upon Valley Bank's knowledge, 
rather than its intent. Nonetheless, since knowledge and intent 
are closely related, it may be useful to examine the evidence and 
applicable legal principles which demonstrate that Valley Bank did 
in fact have knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed. 
At the outset it must be conceded that although there was 
a dispute in the evidence on the issue, the trial court found that 
the loan officer for Valley Bank who made the Residential Loan, 
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Paul Thurston, did not know of the existence of the SBA Trust 
Deed. (See Finding 5., R. 105.) If, therefore, knowledge of 
the existence of the SBA Trust Deed could only be imparted to 
Valley Bank through Mr. Thurston, one would have to concede that 
Valley Bank did not have knowledge of the encumbrance. 
The flaw in Valley Bank's reasoning lies in the fact that 
the Bank had other agents who had knowledge of the existence of 
the SBA Trust Deed, namely, the employees of its SBA Department. 
Indeed, Appellant freely admits that Mthe SBA Department created 
the SBA Trust Deed." (Brief of Appellant, p. 29.) The significance 
of this fact is, of course, that an agent of Valley Bank—the SBA 
Department—knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed because it 
took that Trust Deed as collateral for a loan which it made to the 
Nances. Accordingly, Valley Bank, as principal, had knowledge by 
virtue of the knowledge of its agent. This principle was long ago 
recognized by this court: 
Ordinarily notice to an agent touching the 
subject-matter of his agency or in regard to the 
transaction in which he is engaged is notice to 
his principal. 
B.T. Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24 
P.2d 384, 387 (1933). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 
§ 272 (1958). 
6
"The officer of plaintiff who closed the Residential Loan, 
Paul Thurston, was unaware at the time of closing of the existence 
of the SBA loan." 
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From the foregoing it is clear that even if paragraph 
3(a) of the Exclusions requires knowledge of the defect by Valley 
Bank, the Bank did, in fact, have such knowledge by virtue of the 
knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed by the employees 
of Valley Bank's SBA Department. 
POINT II: 
U.S. LIFE TITLE HAD NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
SBA TRUST DEED ON THE POLICY OR THE COMMITMENT. 
Valley Bank argues in Argument II.A. of its Brief that 
the Policy contains an implied warranty of title, which U.S. Life 
Title breached by failing to list the SBA Trust Deed as an 
exception on Schedule B. For the reasons set forth in subpoints A 
and B below, Valley Bank's argument must be rejected. In any 
case, as discussed in Point IV below, Valley Bank has suffered no 
loss as a result of the omission of the SBA Trust Deed from the 
list of exceptions contained in the Policy. 
A. U.S. LIFE TITLE HAD NO DUTY UNDER THE POLICY TO LIST 
THE SBA TRUST DEED. 
Valley Bank contends that, as a general principle, title 
insurers have a duty to their insureds to list all encumbrances on 
the insured property. Valley Bank's argument is based upon a 
misunderstanding of this court's decision in the case of Bush v. 
Coult, 594 P.2d 865 (Utah 1979), in which the court noted that 
"the policy of title insurance is in the nature of a warranty" 
-23-
{quoting Research Loan & Investment Corp, v. Lawyers Title Ins. 
Corp,, 361 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1966)) (emphasis added). In Bush v. 
Coult the court had to determine whether an insured had the 
obligation to investigate the accuracy of certain information 
indicating a possible cloud on title and to disclose that 
information to the insurer. This court held that "the law imposes 
no duty upon one who seeks title insurance to perform the 
responsibilities of the insurer to ascertain the state of title." 
l£l. at 867. The court supported that conclusion by pointing out 
that it is the title insurer's duty, not the insured's, to 
research the status of the title. The court did not say, however, 
that the policy itself contained implied covenants against 
encumbrances. Such a view would, in effect, impose upon a title 
insurer the duties of an abstracting company. 
This precise issue was raised in the case of Houston 
Title Co. v. Oieda De Toca, 733 S.W. 2d 325 (Tex. App.—Houston 
1987) where the court stated: 
The duties owed by a title insurance company 
to its insured have been well documented and are 
more easily understood in terms of the 
relationship between the two. The title 
insurance company is not, as is an abstract 
company, employed to examine title; rather, the 
title insurance company is employed to guarantee 
the status of title and to insure against 
existing defects. Thus, the relationship between 
the parties is limited to that of indemnitor and 
indemnitee. 
Id. at 327. 
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Similarly in Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
Rptr. 264 (Cal.App. 1987) the court stated: 
The insurer does not represent expressly or 
impliedly that the title is as set forth in the 
policy; it merely agrees that, and the insured 
only expects that, the insurer will pay for any 
losses resulting from, or he will cause the 
removal of, a cloud on the insured's title within 
the policy provisions. . . . A title policy is 
not a summary of the public records and the 
insurer is not supplying information; to the 
contrary he is giving a contract of indemnity. 
The title insurer, as any other insurer, can and 
does assume the risk of its policy. Every 
insurer can and does contract to indemnify 
against specific risks . . . Accordingly, when 
the contingency insured against under the policy 
occurs, the title insurer is not, by that fact 
alone, liable to the insured for damages in 
contract or tort, but rather is obligated to 
indemnify the insured under the terms of the 
policy. 
Id. at 267 (emphasis in original text). 
The language of the Policy itself supports the 
interpretation of title insurance policies offered by thes 
courts. The front page of the policy states: 
Subject to the Exclusions From Coverage, the 
exceptions contained in Schedule B and the 
provisions of the Conditions and Stipulations 
hereof, U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of 
Dallas . . . insures, as of the Date of Policy 
shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not 
exceeding the amount of insurance stated in 
Schedule A, and the costs, attorney's fees and 
expenses which the Company may become obligated 
to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the 
insured by reason of: 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such 
title. 
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(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, first page.) Thus, the Policy is a 
contract to indemnify Valley Bank for any loss suffered as a 
result of any encumbrances not excluded or excepted from the 
Policy. The Policy is not a warranty that no other encumbrances 
exist, and by its very terms the Policy does not cover a loss 
arising from U.S. Life Title's failure to list such an 
encumbrance. It follows that Valley Bank may only recover damages 
from U.S. Life Title if the SBA Trust Deed falls within the 
coverage of the Policy. Since, as demonstrated in Point I, above, 
the SBA Trust Deed is excluded from coverage, Valley Bank is 
without a remedy. 
B. EVEN IF THE POLICY IMPOSES THE DUTIES OF AN ABSTRACTOR 
ON U.S. LIFE TITLE, ENCUMBRANCES CREATED BY VALLEY BANK 
NEED NOT BE REPORTED. 
If, as Valley Bank contends, the Policy imposes on U.S. 
Life Title an implied duty to disclose encumbrances on the insured 
property, that duty is nonetheless circumscribed by the written 
provisions of the Policy. Thus, if one assumes that coverage 
under the Policy includes the duty to disclose encumbrances, it 
must also be true that the Policy's "Exclusions From Coverage" are 
applicable. That conclusion is consistent with the language of 
paragraph 3 of the "Conditions and Stipulations" of the Commitment 
which states: 
In no event shall such liability [i.e., the 
liability of the insurer under the Commitment] 
exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the 
policy or policies committed for and such 
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liability is subject to the insuring provisions, 
the Conditions and Stipulations, and the 
Exclusions From Coverage of the form of policy or 
policies committed for in favor of the proposed 
insured which are incorporated by reference and 
are made a part of this Commitment except as 
expressly modified herein. 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 2 last page.) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, we come full circle: whether Valley Bank's theory 
is based upon the written provisions of the Policy or upon implied 
duties, the Bank must still show that it did not consciously or 
deliberately create the SBA Trust Deed. Since, as demonstrated in 
Point I, above, it cannot meet that burden, the Bank's argument 
must be rejected. 
POINT III; 
U.S. LIFE TITLE IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM RELYING UPON THE 
EXCLUSIONS OF THE POLICY. 
As discussed in Argument IV of its Brief, Valley Bank 
contends that application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
would prohibit U.S. Life Title from raising paragraph 3(a) of the 
Exclusions as a defense to this action. While it is tempting to 
debate whether the facts of the case support the Bank's assertion, 
in reality such a discussion is unnecessary because Valley Bank's 
knowledge of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed and its failure 
to plead or argue the estoppel issue at trial preclude the Bank 
from raising the issue before this court. Those two grounds will 
be discussed separately in the subpoints which follow. 
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A. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE 
VALLEY BANK KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED. 
As has been demonstrated in Point I.e., supra, Valley 
Bank knew of the existence of the SBA Trust Deed from its 
inception because that lien was obtained from the Nances as 
collateral for the SBA Loan. It is well recognized that such 
knowledge disqualifies the possessor from asserting the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel against another. 28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 95 (1966). Thus, this court has stated: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not 
operate in favor of one who has knowledge of the 
essential facts or who has convenient and 
available means of obtaining such knowledge. 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 n.4 (Utah 1976). 
Inasmuch as Valley Bank had knowledge of the existence of 
the SBA Trust Deed, it follows that it may not seek application of 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel against U.S. Life Title. 
B. VALLEY BANK MAY NOT ASSERT THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE IT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW. 
This court adheres to the well-recognized view that: 
[W]here a party neither raises an issue in 
its pleadings nor presents it to the trial court, 
the issue cannot be considered for the first time 
on appeal. 
Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978); 
Hanover Limited v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977). 
This principle applies to Valley Bank's theory of 
equitable estopel. Unless estoppel is pleaded or a claim 
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regarding estoppel is made before the trial court, an appellate 
court may not consider that theory, Currie v. Great Central 
Insurance Co., 374 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1979); Peterson v. 
Moulton, 144 A.2d 717, 720 (Vt. 1958); Vallev Loan Service v. 
Neal, 235 P.2d 932, 935 (Okla. 1951). 
In this case, neither Valley Bank's Complaint (R. 2) nor 
its unsuccessful Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
(R. 31, 33) make any mention of equitable estoppel or of any 
reliance upon representations by U.S. Life Title. Correspond-
ingly, the opening statement at trial of Valley Bank's attorney, 
Mr. Haslam, contains no mention of the words "equitable estoppel" 
or "estoppel". It is therefore clear that Valley Bank's theory of 
equitable estoppel was neither raised in the pleadings nor 
presented at trial. For that reason, the Bank may not now raise 
this issue for the first time before this court. 
POINT IV: 
VALLEY BANK HAS SUFFERED NO INJURY AS A RESULT OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE SBA TRUST DEED. 
Paragraph 6 of the Policy ("Determination and Payment of 
Loss") provides that the liability of U.S. Life Title is the 
lesser of (i) "the actual loss of the insured claimant"; or 
(ii) "the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A . . ."; or 
(iii) "the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage . . . at the time the loss or damage insured against 
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. • • occurs • . • ". The issue raised by the evidence in this 
case is whether any loss attributable to the existence of the SBA 
Loan ever occurred. Relevant to that issue, the evidence adduced 
at trial was that the SBA Trust Deed was never foreclosed, that 
Valley Bank had decided not to foreclose the Trust Deed, and that 
subsequent to the discovery of the SBA Loan by the mortgage 
department of the Bank the Trust Deed was released. 
An insured is not entitled to recover damages from the 
title insurer for all losses which he may suffer, but rather only 
for those losses directly attributable to the failure of title. 
Thus, it has been stated: 
[Wjhile the contract of insurance was 
breached at the time the policy was delivered and 
the title company became immediately liable to 
the insured, it was only liable for the loss that 
the mortgagee actually suffered and for such loss 
as was due to failure of title. 
Narberth Building & Loan Association v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 12 6 
Pa. Super. 74, 190 A. 149, 151 (1937). 
There is no clear evidence that any loss which Valley 
Bank may have suffered was due to a failure of title. Indeed, the 
Bank appears to have treated the SBA Loan, the Residential Loan 
and the Intermountain Thrift Loan as a single transaction. Thus, 
for example, in explaining why the Bank had never foreclosed on 
the SBA Loan a bank officer testified that the SBA Department did 
not want to foreclose sale on "a sister company". (T. 107.) 
Furthermore, at the time of the foreclosure on the Intermountain 
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Thrift Trust Deed Valley Bank, the holder of two superior liens, 
"credit bid" and took title to the property. Thereafter, Valley 
Bank sold the property and the proceeds of sale were applied 
against the SBA Loan. Subsequently, the SBA Trust Deed was 
released and the balance of the loan charged off. (T. 105.) 
Thus, at best, the evidence is unclear as to whether the SBA Trust 
Deed in any way reduced the value of the insured mortgage: the 
Residential Trust Deed. 
In most instances an insured's loss arising from an 
undiscovered prior encumbrance is measured by the amount which he 
must pay in order to cure the defect. Thus, it has been said, 
"the kind of loss contemplated by such a policy is that loss or 
damage sustained when, 'because of a defect in the title,the 
insured was bound to pay something to make it good'". Grunberger 
v. Iseson, 75 A.D. 2d 329, 429, N.Y.S. 2d 209, 211 (1980) (quoting 
Empire Development Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 
53, 121 N.E. 468). 
An enumeration of the ways in which an insured may be 
required to "make it good" is suggested by COUCH ON INSURANCE as 
follows: 
A mortgagee has been held entitled to 
recover, within the limit of his policy, the 
amount of a prior lien which was not disclosed by 
the policy where— 
—he has discharged such lien. 
—he foreclosed his mortgage and bought the 
property subject to such lien. 
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—the existence of such lien was not discovered 
until after he had foreclosed his mortgage and 
bought the property. 
15A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 57:191 (19 83). 
In this case it is clear that Valley Bank has not been 
required to pay anything "to make it good": (1) it has not been 
required to pay off another lien holder for the discharge of its 
lien; (2) it has not foreclosed the Residential Trust Deed and 
bought the property subject to the SBA Lien; and (3) it did not 
discover the existence of the SBA Trust Deed subsequent to 
foreclosure. In short, Valley Bank has suffered no diminution in 
the value of the Residential Trust Deed as result of the existence 
of the SBA Trust Deed. On the contrary, Valley Bank lost its 
trust deed lien by merger of the Trust Deed into the fee title 
estate which the Bank purchased at the Intermountain Thrift 
foreclosure sale. 
This court has described the doctrine of merger as 
follows: 
Ordinarily when one having a mortgage on 
real estate becomes the owner of the fee the 
former estate is merged in the latter, but if it 
was the intention to keep the mortgage alive, or, 
if it is to the interest of the mortgagee, and it 
can be done without prejudice to the rights of 
the mortgagor or third persons, the doctrine of 
merger, as between them will not apply . . . . 
Where such intention is not expressed, the court 
must endeavor to ascertain it by the 
circumstances connected with the transaction or 
must indulge in some presumption by which prima 
facie its existence may be determined. 
O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 773 (1934). 
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In this case the evidence showed that Valley Bank 
purchased the fee title to the subject property on April 4, 1985, 
as part of the foreclosure of the Intermountain Thrift Trust 
Deed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A—attached as Addendum 4.) Valley 
Bank's subsequent actions make it clear that it intended to merge 
the SBA and the Residential Trust Deeds into the fee title estate 
it acquired through the Intermountain Thrift foreclosure: 
—It terminated the pending foreclosure 
proceedings for both the SBA Trust Deed and the 
Residential Trust Deed. 
—It subsequently released both the SBA and the 
Residential Trust Deeds. 
—It conveyed the property to the Weavers by a 
warranty deed. By its use of a warranty deed 
Valley Bank warranted to the Weavers that there 
were no encumbrances on the property. Section 
57-1-12 Utah Code Ann. (1953) (1986 Replacement). 
Since the evidence clearly establishes that the 
Residential Trust Deed was extinguished by merger in April of 
1985, it is obvious that the loss of value of the Residential 
Trust Deed was not caused by the existence of the SBA Trust Deed. 
Under circumstances similar to those in this case, the 
court in Grunberger v. Iseson, supra, found that the loss to an 
insured was not compensable by the title insurer. In that case, 
the insured obtained coverage for its fourth priority mortgage. 
Through inadvertence the insurer insured over a third mortgage. 
When the owner of the property subsequently defaulted in his 
obligations under the fourth mortgage the insured undertook 
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judicial foreclosure proceedings. Upon discovering the adverse 
claim of the third mortgage holder, the insured then commenced a 
declaratory judgment action for the purpose of determining the 
priority of liens and the liability of the title insurer. Before 
judgment could be entered the holder of the second mortgage 
conducted a foreclosure sale which resulted in a deficiency and an 
extinguishment of the third and fourth mortgages. Thereafter, the 
title insurer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
insured had suffered no loss as a result of the existence of the 
third mortgage. The trial court held for the title insurer and 
the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision holding 
that "there was no damage to plaintiff within the terms of the 
policy." 429 N.Y.S.2d at 211. 
The same result is mandated in this case. The 
extinguishment of the Residential Trust Deed was not caused by the 
existence or the foreclosure of the SBA Trust Deed; rather, its 
loss was a product of the merger of the Residential Trust Deed 
into the fee title estate acquired by Valley Bank. For that 
reason, Valley Bank has suffered no loss that requires 
compensation under the Policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties in this case are parties to a contract. That 
contract requires that U.S. Life Title indemnify Valley Bank for 
any loss incurred by the Bank as a result of title defects not 
excluded from coverage. The trial court correctly ruled that the 
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SBA Trust Deed fell within the exclusion for liens "created" by 
Valley Bank. The language of the Policy is clear and unequivocal. 
It is understandable that Valley Bank wishes to escape from the 
clear exclusionary language of the Policy. However: 
Neither of the parties, nor the court has 
any right to ignore or modify conditions which 
are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they 
must be enforced in accordance with the intention 
as manifested by the language used by the parties 
to the contract. 
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223 
(1958) . 
The lower court recognized that the exclusionary language 
of the policy was clear and unequivocal. This court should affirm 
that decision. 
DATED this day of March, 1988. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven H. Gunn 
Attorneys for Respondent 
0074G 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of March, 1988, I 
caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of Dallas to be 
hand-delivered to the following: 
Roy G. Haslam and 
Elizabeth S. Whitney 
BIELE HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 West Broadway 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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STEVEN H. GUNN (A1272) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT IAKE OOUNIY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo— 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LftW 
v. 
: Civil No. C-86-2379 
U.S. TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF DALLAS, a Texas corporation, : (Judge Wilkinson) 
Defendant. : 
— o o o O o o o — 
The trial in the above case cane on for hearing on the 14th day of 
May, 1987, before the Honorable Hcmer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge. 
Appearing on behalf of the plaintiff was Roy G. Haslam of the law firm of 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch. Appearing on behalf of the defendant was Steven H. 
Gunn of the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. Having received various 
documents into evidence ancl having heard the testimony of witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following 
ADDENDUM wn l 
FINDINSS OF FACTS: 
1 . P l a i n t i f f brings this action seeking damages under a certain 
Mortgagee Policy of Ti t le Insurance (the "Policy") (P la int i f f ' s Exhibit 3 ) . 
Under the Policy pla int i f f i s l i s ted as the "named insured". By endorse-
ment the Federal Heme Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHIMC") was also added as 
an insured. 
2 . The Policy was issued for the purpose of insuring p la in t i f f ' s 
trust deed l i en on certain real property (the "subject property") located 
in Suirmit County, Utah. The trust deed insured under the Policy secured 
payment of a loan by p la int i f f to F. Kent Nance and P a t r i c i a J . Nance in 
the sum of $101 r 500.00 . (Hereinafter the loan secured by the trust deed 
covered under the Policy shall be referred to as the "residential loan" and 
the trus t deed shall be referred to as the "residential trust deed".) The 
residential trust deed was executed April 25, 1983, and was recorded April2 
6 , 1983. Subsequent to the c los ing of the loan, plaint i f f assigned the 
loan to FHLMC. 
3 . The residential loan was closed April 26, 1983, and the t i t l e 
policy was issued some time subsequent to July 22 , 1983. Neither the 
Pol icy nor the Commitment which preceded i t specif ical ly identified and 
excluded the SBA trust deed from insurance coverage. 
4 . Previous t o the time of the closing of the residential loan 
p l a i n t i f f ' s SBA loan department had loaned the Nances the sum of $65,000.00 
and had taken as s e c u r i t y for that loan a trus t deed on the subject 
property. (Hereinafter the said earl ier loan made by p l a i n t i f f sha l l be 
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referred to as the "SBA loan" and the trust deed which secured its payments 
will be referred to as the "SBA trust deed.) The date of execution of the 
SBA trust deed was April lf 1983. It was recorded on April 5, 1983. 
5. The officer of plaintiff who closed the residential loan, Paul 
Thurston, was unaware at the time of closing of the existence of the SBA 
loan. 
6. At the time the title policy was issued by defendant insuring 
the residential loan, its agent, Mountain View Title, was aware that the 
prior SBA trust deed was of record and failed to oannunicate such knowledge 
to the plaintiff prior to issuing the Policy* 
7. Paragraph 3(a) ("Exclusions from Coverage") of the Policy 
provides: 
The following matters are expressly excluded fran coverage 
of this Policy: 
. . . 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other 
matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the 
insured claimant . . . 
8. In November, 1983, the Nances borrowed the sum of $10,000.00 
fran Intermountain Thrift & Loan ("Intermountain Thrift") and gave as 
security a trust deed on the subject property and on an adjacent unimproved 
lot owned by the Nances. 
9. In early 1984, the Nances defaulted in making payments on the 
SBA and residential loans. They also defaulted on the Intermountain Thrift 
loan. As a consequence, Intermountain Ttirift filed a notice of default and 
thereafter sold the subject property and the adjacent lot by trustee1 s sale 
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on April 4, 1985, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the sale and 
received a Trustee's Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A) vrtiich recited a purchase 
price in the sum of $11,941.45. 
10. At no time has plaintiff or FHLMC ever foreclosed judicially 
or nonjudicially on the subject property. 
11. On or about November 21,1986, plaintiff sold the subject 
property to Gary T. Weaver and Shauna L. Weaver ("the Weavers") and 
delivered to them a warranty deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21). 
12. The purchase price paid by the Weavers to plaintiff upon sale 
of the subject property was $55,000.00. The net proceeds which plaintiff 
received from the sale was $51,857.17. The proceeds of sale were applied 
by plaintiff against the amount owed on the SBA loan. 
13. On or about December 23, 1986, plaintiff released its SBA 
trust deed lien on the subject property by a Full Reconveyance (Defendant's 
Exhibit 25). 
14. On or about December 11, 1986, plaintiff paid FHLMC the full 
amount owed under the residential loan. An officer of plaintiff testified 
at trial that the residential trust deed lien would be released by recon-
veyance as soon as practical following the trial. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF U W 
A. The act of plaintiff in obtaining from the Nances a trust deed 
lien on the subject property to secure payment of the SBA loan "'created a 
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lien or encumbrance" within the meaning of the Policy. 
B. The lien of the SBA trust deed is excluded from coverage under 
the Policy by paragraph 3(a) of the Exclusions from Coverage. 
C. Defendant is not liable under the Policy for losses incurred 
by Plaintiff as a result of the existence of the SBA trust deed. 
D. Plaintiff1 s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and 
upon the merits. 
E. Because the SBA trust deed is excluded from coverage under the 
Policyr it is unnecessary for the Court to determine what loss plaintiff 
incurred as the result of the existence of the said trust deed or to 
determine whether plaintiff breadied the Policy as alleged by Defendant in 
its Supplemental Ansvrer. 
-5-
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for Title Insurance 
USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, Dallas, Texas, A Texas Corporation, herein called the Company, 
for valuable consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Sched-
ule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest 
covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A. upon payment of the premiums and charges 
therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the 
policy or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the 
time of issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability 
and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when 
the policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such 
policy or policies is not the fault of the Company. The Commitment shall not be valid or binding until 
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this Commitment to be signed 
and sealed as of the effective date of Commitment shown in Schedule A. 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas 
tfU/M^ 
President 6 Chief Executive Officer 
46*S/tc*6u/#&-£~ 
Attest Se/ior Vice-President. Secretery end General Counsel 
L * ^CIJK~^-'<:-L C J < 
Authorized Countersignature 
r—>~—~—*v^~"*—v " • ^ ^ 
f; MOUNTAIN VIEW T I T I I T C i 
1117 East Country HMa Dr. 
Ogden, Utah S4403 
(§01) 47*1170-1171-1172 
(•01) 544-4245 
ADDENDUM NO- 2 
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION coPvmftMT w * /o*v i 
Prepared for: VALLEY MORTGAGE 
Attn: Paul Thurston 
SCHEDULE A 
inquiries should be directed 
GFNo. D 2643 to Kevin Parkinson 
1. Effective date: A p r i l 15, 1983 § 8:00 a.m. 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: Amount 
(a) • ALTA Owners Policy — Form —1970 $ 
Proposed Insured: 
(b) £) ALTA Standard Loan Policy, Coverage —1970 i 1 Q 1 ' 5 0 ° * 0 0 
(435.00) 
Proposed Insured: VALLEY MORTGAGE 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is: 
Fee Sinple 
4. Title to said estate or interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE, his wife, as joint tenants. 
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is located in the County of Summit 
State of Utah smd described as follows: 
BEGINNING 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter Section Corner 
on the West line of Section 17, Ttawnship 3 South, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence North 185.97 feet, more or less, to the South 
boundary line of State Road right-of-way; thence along said boundary South 69° 
59' East 106.4 feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence West 100 feet to the 
place of beginning. 
ALSO BEING KNOWN and designated as Lot 3 of KAMP KILL KARE LOTS, according to 
the official plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of 
Summit County. 
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of the 
following described center line, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary 
line of State Road right-of-way 632 feet North and 856.1 feet East of the 
quarter section corner on West line of said Section 17; thence'South 468.5 
feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less, to the State Road 
right-of-way. 
SCHEDULE B-ll 
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the 
same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company: 
1. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the 
public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the pro-
posed Insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by 
this Commitment. 
2. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
3. Any discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, overlapping of im-
provements, or other boundary or location disputes. 
4. Any roadway or easement, similar or dissimilar, on, under, over, or across said property, or any part 
thereof not shown by the public records. 
5. Any liens for labor, services, or material, or claims to same which are not shown by the public 
records. 
6. Any titles or rights asserted by anyone including, but not limited to, persons, corporations, govern-
ments, or other entities, to tidelands, or lands comprising the shores or bottoms of navigable 
streams, lakes, bays, oceans, or gulf, or lands beyond the line of the harbor or bulkhead lines estab-
lished or changed by the United States Government or riparian rights, if any. 
7. Any unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the is-
suance thereof; water rights, claims or titles to water. 
8. Community property, dower, courtesy or homestead rights, if any, of any spouse of the insured. 
9. The lien of all taxes and assessments for the year 19 , and thereafter. 
10. Restrictive covenants affecting the property above described. 
11. Taxes for the year 1982 were paid in the amount of $338.66, T&xes for 
the year 1983 are now accruing as a lien but are not yet due or payable, 
SERIAL NUMBER: KK-3 ^ /^~ 
12.^ Said property is included within the boundaries of Weber Basin Water 
/Ocopservancy District, South Summit Fire Protection District, South Summit 
Xemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7, and is subject to any 
charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided. 
//13\ Rio^fcs of way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines now 
/ ^-eJcisting over, under or across said property. 
^ 7 Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc., 
Q together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract 
his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate or intersect 
the premises, and the right of ingress and egress for the use of said 
rights. 
14. WVRRANrtY DEED 
Dated: January 29, 1953 
Deeded To: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
~**\ Book: U Page: 332 
"As a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not 
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or 
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon 
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any 
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deed to 
become null and void." 
DEED OF TRUST tfL £/^-?3 
Dated: September 18, 1981 t * eJ<G ,$£? 
Amount: $97,000.00 Plus Interest <AJ$ -<jjX I'"^; %&/ 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA JEANNE NANCE 9j^J>^ __ 
Beneficiary: FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH yU*^'*^cj&l)$3''5~> 
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY ~a'^/ - \ - ? s / <&/s~>- ft£ J* 
Recorded: September 22, 1981 *<* * W *<-& G^O/?*/? - & 
Entry No: 183798 ' T ^ 3 " %3 *?*> £ s •*> "? 
Book: M198 Page: 69ft ^ ^ ^ T & r?ry /+£? 
DEED OF TRUST ' ^ H ^ ' ^ ' // 
Dated: September 24, 1981 /s^y&^'s s\ 
Amount: $57,147.00 X /£x / ^ r 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE r {/<y C 
Beneficiary: THE CITIZENS BANK 
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
Recorded: October 8, 1981 
Entry No: 184407 
Book: M200 Page: 312 
JUDGEMENTS were checked against the names of the following and none 
were found to be of record: 
F. KENT NANCE 
PATRICIA J. NANCE 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1. Tha tarm mortgage." whan usad harain, shall include 6—6 of trust, trust daad. or othar security instrument 
2. H tha proposad Insured has or acquiras actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim 
or other matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other 
than those shown in Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to tha Company in 
writing, tha Company shall be relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of 
reliance hereon to tha extant tha Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the 
proposad Insurad shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires 
actual knowledge of any such dafect. lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or othar matter, the Company at 
its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve 
the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions w>6 Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be onfy to the named proposed Insured 9n6 such 
parties included under tha definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only 
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with tha requirements 
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B. or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest 
or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated 
in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such liability it subject to the insuring provisions, 
the Conditions and Stipulations, and tha Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed 
for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part 
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein 
4 . Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may hava or may bring against the 
Company arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon 
covered by this Commitment must be based on 9r\6 are subject to the provisions of this Commitment 
Mortgagee Policy fe^,,.* 
of Title 
Insurance If *3SX£r* 
! £A 
POLICY OF H U E INSURANCE Issued by USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN 
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called 
the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, 
not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys fees 
and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or 
incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as 
stated therein: 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title; 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate 
or interest except to the extent that such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, 
arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is based upon 
a. usury, or 
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage, 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain 
priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an 
improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of Policy 
not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage which at Date of Policy, the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or 
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A. of the 
insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mongage 
in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this 
policy to be signed and sealed by its duly authorized officers in facsimile to be valid, as 
of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, only when it bears an authorized, original 
countersignature. 
jU/tf& 
Prtst&nt A Chft Eu9cutiv Ofhcf 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
Exclusions From Coverage 
The following matters ere expressly excluded from the coverage 
of this policy: 
1. Any law. ordinance or governmental regulation (including but 
not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of 
the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location 
of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or 
prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the 
dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation 
of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation. 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police 
power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in 
the public records at Date of Policy. 
3. Defects. Kens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other mat-
ters.(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured 
Conditions 
1. Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) Insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "in-
sured" also includes (i) the owner of the indebtedness secured by 
the insured mortgage and each successor in ownership of such 
indebtedness (reserving, however, all rights and defenses as to any 
such successor who acquires the indebtedness by operation of law 
as distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, 
distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of 
kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the Company would 
have had against the successor's transferor), and further includes 
(ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an insurer 
or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or 
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether 
named as an insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated 
in paragraph 2 (a) of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage 
hereunder. 
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowl-
edge or notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of 
any public records. 
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in 
Schedule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law con-
stitute real property; provided, however, the term "land" does not 
include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically de-
scribed or referred to in Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, 
estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, 
ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent 
to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other 
•security instrument. 
(f) "public records": those records which by.law impart con-
structive notice of matters relating to said land. 
1 (a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition 
of Tit le 
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of 
in insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in 
he land described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, con-
veyance in lieu of foreclosure, or other legal manner which dis-
rharges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a 
corporation, its transferee of the estate or interest so acquired, 
provided the transferee is the parent or wholly owned subsidiary of 
he insured; and in favor of any governmental agency or instrumen-
ality which acquires all or any part of the estate or interest 
pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or guaran-
aeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided 
iat the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, 
xclustve of costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company 
iay become obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of: 
(i) the amount of insurance stated, in Schedule A; 
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as 
defined in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses 
of foreclosure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the 
insured mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at 
the time of acauisttion of •m*H •»«••••**-:-* 
claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by th 
public records but known to the insured claimant either a 
Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estati 
or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mort 
gage and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant tc 
the Company prior to the date such insured claimant becarr* 
an insured hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the 
insured claimant; (d) attaching 6r created subsequent to Dati 
of Policy (except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as 
to any statutory lien for labor or material). 
Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because 
of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent 
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing 
business" laws of the state in which the land is situated. 
and Stipulations 
tality, if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, 
in the acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of 
its insurance contract or guaranty. 
(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance 
of Title 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date 
of Policy in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an 
estate or interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by 
a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from such in-
sured, or so long as such insured shall have liability by reason of 
covenants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or 
conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this 
policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaser from 
such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness 
secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured. 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of 
Claim to be given by an insured Claimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall 
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of 
actions or proceedings commenced against such insured, or 
defenses, restraining orders or injunctions interposed against a 
foreclosure of the insured mortgage or a defense interposed against 
an insured in an action to enforce a contract for a sale of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or a sale of the 
estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is 
founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter 
insured against by this policy. 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing 
(i) in case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restrain-
ing order or injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in 
case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder of any claim of 
title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, and which might 
cause loss or damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue 
of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest or the lien of 
the insured mortgage, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If 
such prompt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to 
such insured all liability of the Company shall cease and terminate 
in regard to the matter or matters for which such prompt notice is 
required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in no case 
prejudice the rights of any such insured under this policy unless the 
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the 
extent of such prejudice. 
(c) The Company shall have the right at Its own cost to institute and 
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do arty 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish 
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as 
' insured, and the Company may take any appropriate action under the 
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and shall 
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or inter-
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provions of this policy 
the Company mav mirtu>* ««« ** »*** |:*:—A-~ - - - * 
M U ( b i b b 
SCHEDULE A 
e of Policy: April 26, 1983 @ 4:00 p.m. GF No.
 D 2643 
ount of Insurance $ 101,500.00 
(435.00) 
lame of Insured: 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
he estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: (a fee. 
sasehold, etc.) _ 
fee simple 
he estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE, 
his wife, as joint tenants 
tie mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as 
Hows: 
DEED OF TRUST 
Dated: April 25, 1983 
Anount: $101,500.00 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE, husband and wife 
Beneficiary: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
Trustee: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
Recorded: April 26, 1983 
Entry Number: 205040 
Book: 258 Page: 542 
e land referred to in this policy is described as follows: 
Beginning 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter 
Section corner on the West line of Section 17, Township 3 South, 
Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
185.97 feet, more or less, to the South boundary line of State Road 
Right of Way; thence along said boundary South 69°59' East 106.4 
feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence East 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. Also being known and designated as Lot 3 of Kamp Kill 
Rare Lots, according to the official plat thereof on file in the office 
of the County Recorder of Sumrdt County. Together with a right of 
way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of the following described 
centerline, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary line of 
State Road Right of Way 632 feet North and 856; 1 feet East of the 
Ouarter Section corner of the West line of said section 17; thence 
South 468.5 feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less, 
tr% the* Ct-at-o D«»#* o<#o»«- ~c t.i— 
POLICY NO M 076156 
This Policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
. Taxes for the yean IW? were paid. SERIAL NUMBER: KK 3 
• Said property is included within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, South Sumiit Fire Protection .District, South Summit 
Cemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7 and is subject to any 
charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided. 
Charges are current. 
Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines now 
existing over, under or across said property. 
Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc., 
together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract 
his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate on intersect 
the premises, and the rigfrt to ingress and egress for the use of said 
rights. 
WARRANIY DEED 
Dated: January 29, 1953 
Deeded to: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC, 
Book: U Page: 332 
,fAs a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not 
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or 
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon 
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any 
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deed to 
become null and void." 
SCHEDULE B-PART II 
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land descnbed or referred to 
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that such matters Bt9 subordinate 
to the lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest: 
None 
Endorsement 
(to and forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No. . . . r.'?*rP. ) 
Issued by 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company hereby insures against loss which said Insured shall sustain by reason of any of the following 
matters 
1 . Any incorrectness in the assurance which the Company hereby gives: 
(a) That there ere no covenants, conditions, or restrictions under which the lien of the mortgage or deed 
of trust referred to in Schedule A can be cut off. subordinated, or otherwise impaired. 
(b) That there are no present violations on said land of any enforceable covenants, conditions, or restrictions; 
(c) That, except as shown in Schedule B. there are no encroachments of buildings, structures, or improvements 
located on said land onto adjoining lands, nor any encroachments onto said land of buildings, structures. 
or improvements located on adjoining lands. 
2 . (a) Any future violations on said land of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions occurring prior to acquisition 
of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, provided such violations result in loss or impairment of the lien of 
the mortgage referred to in Schedule A. or result in loss or impairment of the title to said estate or interest if the 
Insured shall acquire such title in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by such mortgage; 
(b) Unmarketability of the title to said estate or interest by reason of any violations on said land, occurring prior to 
acquisition of title to S9id estate or interest by the Insured, of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions. 
3. Damage to existing improvements, including lawns, shrubbery or trees: 
(a) Which are located or encroach upon that ponion of the land subject to any easement shown in Schedule 
B. which damage results from the exercise of the right to use or maintain such easement for the purposes for 
which the same was granted or reserved; 
(b) Resulting from the exercise of any right to use the surface of said land for the extraction or development 
of the minerals excepted from the description of said land or shown as a reservation in Schedule B. 
4 . Any final court order or judgment requiring removal from any land adjoining said land of any encroachment 
shown in Schedule B. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shall, however, 
not exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated 
under the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations 
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
This Endorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title as of any later date than the date of said policy, 
except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature. 
p.ted Apr i l ?6, 1983 
PfsktiM A Ou§f £M§cutt¥» Otfrtf 
&«^tiu/&&4f 
Endorsement 
(to »r\d forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No M 076156 , 
Issued by 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company assures the Insured that at the date of said policy there is located on said land 
A single family dwelling also known as: 
The 7 Mile Marker of Highway 35 
Woodiand, Utah 84036 
and that the map attached to this policy shows the correct location and dimensions of the land described 
in Schedule A as described by those records which under the recording laws impart constructive notice as 
to said land 
The Company hereby insures the Insured against loss which said Insured shall sustain in the event the assurances 
herem shall prove to be incorrect. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy 9nd any endorsements attached thereto shall, however, not 
exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated under 
the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations 
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature. 
n..^ April 26, 1983 
&9$td0*t § Chft lEtcvthf OffKf 
factJ/luilu/tttLlt 
CLTA Fern MtUuh-An.) ISM 1TW 
INDORSEMENT Fee $ 
Attached to Policy No. M 076156 
Issued by 
I H J F E TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas 
The Company assures . . . 
(a) That by a valid assignment or assignments the beneficial interest under 
the mortgage referred to in paragraph 4 of ALIA Schedule A 
has been transferred to said Assured; 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MDKTCAGE CORPORATION 
(b) That there are no subsisting tax or assessment liens which are prior to 
said mortgage except: 
(c) That there are no matters affecting the validity or priority of the lien of 
said mortgage, other than those shown in said policy, except: 
(d) That there are no United States tax liens or bankruptcy proceedings affec-
ting the title to said estate or interest shown by the public records, other 
than those shown in said policy, except: 
The Company hereby insures said Assured against any loss of principal, interest or other sums 
secured by said mortgage, which said Assured shall sustain in the event that the assurances herein 
shall prove to be incorrect. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any indorsements therein shall not exceed, 
in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and costs which the Company is obligated under the 
conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This indorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipu-
lations therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
This indorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title to said estate or interest as of any later 
date than the date of said policy, except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof. 
Dated: July 13, 1983
 f jj*'"^ 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY of Dallas ^l^lf -JL * r " 
Pf%to*n\ * C*fef £fftciffto Otllft 
JL^ti&~C 
At fit $»nlor Wc*-Pf*aMtJ)f. jfcwry antf Tf*wr 
.*s 
(Conditions arJ^^pulations c6ntinueo wna 
(e) In all cases where this policy permmWr requires the Com-
pany to prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or 
proceeding, the insured hereunder shall secure to the Company 
the right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action or 
proceeding, Bnd all appeals therein, and permit the Company to 
use, at its option, the name of such insured for such purpose. 
Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall give the 
Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in 
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or 
prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding, and the Com-
pany shall reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred. 
Not ice of Loss—Limitation of Act ion 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these 
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or 
damage for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this 
policy shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days after such 
oss or damage shall have been determined and no right of action 
shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such state-
ment shall have been furnished. Failure to furnish such statement 
>f loss or damage shall terminate any liability of the Company 
inder this policy as to such loss or damage. 
I Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle 
or or in the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against 
r to terminate all liability and obligations of the Company here-
r)6^r by paying or tendering payment of the amount of insurance 
nder this policy together with any costs, attorneys' fees and ex-
enses incurred up to the time of such payment or tender of pay-
lent by the insured claimant and authorized by the Company. In 
ise loss or damage is claimed under this policy by an insured, the 
ompany shall have the further option to purchase such indebted-
*ss for the amount owing thereon together with all costs, 
torneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated 
»reunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebted-
»ss as herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness shall 
msfer and assign said indebtedness and the mortgage and any 
l^ateral securing the same to the Company upon payment there-
r as herein provided. 
Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no 
se exceed the least of: 
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, 
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or 
[iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the 
time the loss or damage insured against hereunder occurs, 
together with interest thereon. 
b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against 
this policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation car-
i on by the Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys' 
s and expenses in litigation carried on by such insured with the 
tten authorization of the Company. 
c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with 
conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable 
hin 30 days thereafter. 
Limitation of Liability 
lo claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if 
Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, 
or encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or 
trwise, removes such defect. Ken or encumbrance or estab-
BS the title, or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, 
tin a reasonable time after receipt of such notice; (b) in the 
nt of litigation until there has been a final determination by a 
rt of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals 
efrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured mort-
a, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or (c) for 
Irty voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or 
without Drior written consent of the Company. 
Reduction of Liability 
) All payments under this oolicv. exe*nt *»%#«»**«• -*-*-> «~ 
conciuoed from reverae^^ of policy face) 
the acquisition of titlHB satd estate or interest as provided in 
paragraph 2(a| of these Conditions and Stipulations, shall not re-
duce pro tanto the amount of the insurance afforded hereunder 
except to the extent that such payments reduce the amount of the 
indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage. 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release 
of the insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company 
except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by addi-
tional principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, 
except as to amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured 
mortgage and secured thereby. 
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for en-
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed. 
in which case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
Liability Noncumulative 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfac-
tion of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any 
part thereof, it is expressly understood that the amount of insur-
ance under this policy shall be reduced by any amount the Com-
pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage hereafter 
executed by an insured which is a charge or lien on the estate or 
interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount so 
paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. 
If: Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this 
policy, all right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaf-
fected by any act of the insured claimant, except that the owner of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage may release or 
substitute the personal liability of any debtor or guarantor, or ex-
tend or otherwise modify the terms of payment, or release a por-
tion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured mortgage, 
or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided 
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any 
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not 
result in any loss of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. 
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights 
and remedies which such insured claimant would have had against 
any person or property \r\ respect to such claim had this policy not 
been issued, and if requested by the Company, such insured 
claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights and remedies 
against any person or property necessary in order to perfect such 
right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the 
name of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation in-
volving such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the 
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to 
such rights and remedies in the proportion which said payment 
bears to the amount of said loss, but such subrogation shall be in 
subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss of priority should 
result from any act of such insured claimant, such act shall not 
void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required 
to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which 
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of 
the impairment of the right of subrogation. 
Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instru-
ments, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy 
and contract between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negli-
gence, and which arises out of the status of the Hen of the insured 
mortgage or of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby 
or any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to the pro-
visions and conditions and stipulations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made 
except by writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by 
either the President, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant 
Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of the 
Company. 
Notices. Where Sent 
MITE I I I L C I IXOUriMIVOC 
Company of Dallas 
iWortgagi 
Ifcrf Tit le 
'hsUrahc 
OFFICERS 
"obtrtD. OofoeM Prttidant tnd 
n . ^ „ C " * 1 Citcutivt Offictr 
Ortkt McKtt Consultant 
Robtrt Michael Cltrfc Sanior Vict Prtsidtnt. 
Stcrtttry and Gtntrt l Counstl 
Eogtnt I . Shtpptrd . . . . Stmor Vict Prasidtnt 
Htrry A Fishtf . . . Vict Prtsidtnt •nd Traasurar 
£ * " G i *V Vict Prtsidtnt tnd Controller 
Donna Comstock
 V ,ct Prtsidtnt 
Ttss Goad .
 V | C # P r t f i d e n | 
Ctthtrint Gray
 V | C # P f t l i d < m | 
£ ? * ^ i G J l t t i , , 0 f l Vict Prtsidtnt 
























If EXHIBIT | 
1 .jug*- Y 
van BicotDQ) JUIC TOI -^  
AUPKID J^mtUB. Attorney at Lew, WBuW 
alt Bs#fXth tooth 
fait Uba City, Hub 14X02 
?ALLET 1AME AMD TBJST COMPANY (barala eallad Traatoo) aa Trustee aadar tba 
treat daad baraiaaftar partiaalarly described, doas hereby Eergaia, Sail aai Ceawey, 
without warraaty. to VALLEY BANE AMD Tturr COMPAKY 
1 1 7 7 . me* c*>Jo* oV MtbtrCv.iiT f^Oi-i (herein oaUad Creates) aU af tba raal 
property eiteste in tt» Qseaty of tcmiT
 t Itata of ttab t aoocrlbod aa 
(goo attacbad labiblt "A", far legal description, attacbad barata aad 
by tbia rafaraaca Bade a part hereof.) 
ice 
t 7*ai 
ia aedc paraaaat to ftwEgowcapcgafarTad apoa sTrmtst>br tb^ 
trus t daad bstwaea f. KENT NANCE AND PATRICIA J. IUL1LE 
aa Trustor, tbo Traatoo barala, and INTERM0ONTAIN THRIFT AND LOAN 
mm Beneficiary, racordad Moveaber 18, 1983 , aa Entry Mo. 213204 la Book 279
 9 
at Page 60 # guaadt County, Utah Becorda, aad after fu l f i l l* 
of tba aoadltioaa apaclflad ia aaid truat daad autboriaiAi tbia conveyance aa fa l -
ls 
(a) ftafaalt aecurrad la tbo obligations for which such truat daad was given 
aa aaearity aad tba laaaficiary aade daaaad upoa said Trustaa to sai l aaid proparty par* 
auaat to tbo t a n s af aaid truat daad. Motlcs of dsfault was racordod as Entry Mo. 
227277 • 1* Book 320 , at Fags 382 • County loeords (aad ia tba off las 
of tho locordar af aaeb atbar county ia which tbo proporty dascrlbad ia said Trust Daad9 
or au/ part charoof, ia eitaatad), tba aatura af such dafault baiag aa aat forth la 
aaid aotlea af dafault» aad copy af such aotlca was aailad by eartlflad aall to oaeb 
poraoa aao racordod a rofusat therefore* Such dafault s t i l l existed at tba tiaa af sola. 
(a) Mara than tbraa aontbs aftar racardatloa af aaid aotlca af dafault, 
Trustaa gave aotlca af tba tin* aad alaca af tba asls of said proparty by eartlflad 
• a l l by pootiag la a coaapiouoao alaca aa tba proparty to ba sold, aad ia thrss public 
places af each city or couaty fit which tba property, or aoaa part thereof, i s situated, 
aad by publlabiag ia a newspaper having a general circulation ia each couaty ia which 
the property ia situs ted. 
(a) Tba provisions, recitals aad contents of the Notice of Default referred 
to ia paragraph (a) eapra, shall ba aad tbay are hereby incorporated herein aad aade aa 
integral part hereof, for a l l purposes as though set forth herein et length. 
(d) All raajuiraaaata af law regarding the sai l ing, posting, publication bad 
reeordlag af aotlca af dafault, sod aotlca af sale, aad af a l l atbar aaticea have beam 
coaplled with. 
(a) Trustee, at tba tiaa aad place of eele fixed by aaid aotlca, at public 
auction, ia aaa parcel, struck aff to Or an tee, being the highest bidder therefore, tba 
proparty herein deocrlbed, far tba aunt af $ 11,941.45 , eubject however, to a l l 
prior liens aad eacaabraacaa. l a parson or corporation offered to take any part af 
aaid property leas then tba whole thereof for tbo aaouat af principal, interest, ad* 
•te. 
EM VRKEgg MBEBEOP, tba greater, pursuant to a resolution of i t s board af 
Directors, baa caused i t s corporate aaaa to ba hereunto eubecrlhed by i t s . 
aad i ta eorporete seal to be affixed this 4 t n day af April • -*gs 
WJ J f t | 1A1LEY BANK AMD TBDET tt*PAMT, Trustee 
fTATI Of UTAM Vatateh i M asslstsat Vi/s President 4 Msnsgsr 
000b i t Of MMbtieut ) ^ 
0a tba 4th day af t»rtl t Mgs • faraoaaliy appeared 
before aa Clair J. Mortoa • *ho being by m duly lawqga, aid 
aay that he, tbo aaid plslr J. Norton i s tba Assiatsnt Vice President 4 Mg 
of VALLEY BAM AMD TBOfT QpMPAMY, Trustee, the corporation that saocut^gbe^rtgoiag 
instrument aa euch Trustee by authority of a resolution of i t s boartf>{ iiVs>tgHi #»-
aaid Cialr J. Norton
 t duly acknow^fea *©a¥jt l \ t*ald 
aorporatlon aiecatad tbo aaaa mm auch Truetee. 
My fab|ia # *VV%y' \*£*>y?+2fo M*t 7
W OMriNlN M»iK»t MffMt J. INT *'\V2s*A»*5SlS 
i M t i i l l l M Mitfray. uelh • v * » » * * * * . > 
mt i iT A 
rA*t:t:i. I : 
gU.lttUNC 115.55 f»Ht north end 1444.1 foot Eoet of the Quarter Section Corner 
««t the Hem line of Section 17, Townnhip 3 houth, Senge 7 Kaet, l « l t Ufce Moo 
ond her id ian
 9 and running thence north 145.f7 f e e t , acre or loan, to tin? South 
peundary l i n e of State good r ight -o f -uey ; theaco eleag M i a boundary South 
49*59 f Coot 104.4 foot ; toeoce Sooth 144.74 foot; thence beet I M foot to too 
pUiiV of ftgClNNINi;. 
ALSO tu ing known and designated a« Lot 3 KAHP KILL KAIE LOTS, according to tho 
p l a t thereof on f i l e U the o f f ico of the County fcecordcr of Suooiit County, Utah. 
TiH.ITMKk with .1 rl jcht-of-vay 20 feci wide being 10 feet on e i ther slda of tho 
l«ij lowing deecrieed r e n t c r l i n * , being on o point on tho Sooth quarter houndery 
l im* of State HUu%d r ight -of -way; 612 feet North mnd 456.1 feet Cast of quarter 
oection corner ««n We*: j lne of * * i d Section 17; thence South 464.5 feet t ea t 
Jcwo i f t i ; thence Morth 40 f e e t . wire or lean' to the State goad r ight-of-way. 
IAKOX 2 : 
U**iKWLiMC North 374.35 feet and Eaat 1419.9 feet froo the Heat one quarter 
. . •n i iT «»f Section 17, Townehip 3 South, Hani;c 7 Eaet, Salt Lake nose aod 
i ie r id i .m; thence South 49#59v fc.i*t 49.17 f e e t ; thence South 45.97 fee t ; thence 
WrKt 71.0 fee t ; thence North 13#33V44N Ka*t 105*75 feet to the point of 
*vi;iuii it i£. 
337n«405 
^ t e . *i\o, 
